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Summary
We analyse growth dynamics in an economy where the well-being of economic agents
depends on three goods: leisure, a free access environmental good and a private good
which can be produced by each agent through his own labour input. The private good
can be consumed as a substitute for the environmental resource. The production process
of the private good by each agent generates negative externalities on the other agents,
by depleting the free access natural resource; but it also produces positive externalities
by increasing the productivity of labour via a learning-by-doing mechanism of
accumulation of knowledge [which is a pure public good]. In this context, we show that
attracting steady states may exist which are Pareto-dominated by others where
aggregate private consumption and labour productivity are lower. However, negative
externalities can also be an engine of desirable growth: the deterioration of the
environmental good can play the role of a coordination device leading economic agents
to a wider exploitation of positive externalities.
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 INTRODUCTION 
We present a model in which the deterioration of a free access environmental good is an 
engine of economic growth. In particular, we analyse the dynamics of an economy where only 
one private good is produced, which may be consumed as a substitute for a free access 
renewable environmental good or to satisfy needs different from those satisfied by the 
environmental resource
1. The production process of the private good deteriorates the 
environmental resource and the deterioration of it [ceteris paribus] leads agents to increase 
their labour input in the production process of the private good in order to produce and 
consume higher quantities of the private good as a substitute for the environmental good. 
Clearly, this substitution mechanism may generate a self-enforcing economic growth process 
driven by the continuous increase of agents’ needs for private consumption generated by the 
progressive reduction of the free consumption of the environmental good. 
We study such mechanism in an adaptive model where the growth process is conditioned 
by both negative and positive externalities; agents take as exogenously given the aggregate 
negative impact of economic activity on the environmental good; so, the production of the 
private good by each agent generate negative externalities. However, the production process 
of the private good [which is assumed as non storable] by each agent generates positive 
externalities via a learning-by-doing mechanism of accumulation of knowledge [which is a 
pure public good]. 
In this context, negative externalities –through the substitution process described above-
may lead agents towards a better exploitation of positive externalities driving the economy 
outside a poverty trap. However, we also show that there may exist growth paths along which 
the [cumulative] effect of positive externalities is not able to counterbalance that of negative 
externalities; that is, the economy may approach a fixed point characterized by relatively high 
consumption of private goods and accumulation of knowledge, which is Pareto-dominated by 
other fixed points with lower private consumption and accumulation of knowledge. In such 
case, economic growth is undesirable and is the consequence of a coordination failure.  
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 1 and 2 deal with related literature; in sections 
3, 4 and 5 we present the model; in sections 6, 7 and 8 we analyse it. Finally, Section 9 
concludes the paper.  
 
                                                 
1 Two goods are said [Edgeworth] substitutes if the marginal utility of one decreases as the quantity of the other 
increases [see e.g. Zhang (1999)].   3
1. RELATED LITERATURE 
The “push factor” role played by the scarcity of natural resources has been pointed out by 
several empirical studies
2. Rauch (1989) proves that the growth in pro-capita consumption has 
been slower in countries with relatively large endowment of land per capita. Sachs and 
Warner (1995) analyse a sample of 97 developing countries and consider the annual growth 
rates between 1970-89 and the exports of natural resources in 1970 of each country [resource-
based exports are defined as agriculture, minerals, and fuels] and find that natural resource 
abundance and economic growth are inversely correlated over this period. For further 
references about empirical results see Sachs and Warner (1999)
3. 
Said empirical results may be generated by certain mechanisms highlighted by economic 
literature. The idea that the scarcity of natural resources can play a part as “push factor” in 
economic growth processes was already contemplated in Karl Marx’s Capital [Capital, vol. I, 
ch.24 (sec.2)], as he credits a driving role to the Commons’ “enclosure” process in relation to 
the English Industrial Revolution. Marx seems to acknowledge a “push factor” role not only 
in relation to the agricultural productivity growth associated with enclosures, but also to the 
fact that a significant number of individuals excluded from access to the Commons 
contributed to the supply of “cheap labour” necessary for the take-off of the manufacturing 
industry
4.  The impact of the enclosures process in the creation of labour supply for the 
English manufacturing industry has been recently underlined by Humphries (1990): 
 
“……..parliamentary enclosure eroded nonwage sources of subsistence available to semi-
proletarian families and left them increasingly dependent on wages.……..As in many parts of 
the Third World today, semi-proletarianization took the form of the husband/father working 
for wages while the wife/mother and the children added to family subsistence by exploiting 
traditional rights to rural resources……..enclosure increased families’ dependence on wages 
and wage earners, pressures which can be understood only in the context of the importance of 
family participation in securing an eighteenth-century livelihood. If proletarianization is seen 
                                                 
2 “The oddity of resource-poor economies outperforming resource-rich economies has been a constant motif of 
economic history. In the seventeenth century, resource-poor Netherlands eclipsed Spain, despite the overflow of 
gold and silver from the Spanish colonies in the New World. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, resource-
poor countries such as Switzerland and Japan surged ahead of resource-abundant economies such as Russia. In 
the past thirty years, the world’s star performers have been the resource-poor Newly Industrializing Economies 
of East Asia- Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore- while many resource-rich economies such as the oil-rich 
countries of Mexico, Nigeria, Venezuela, have gone bankrupt.” [Sachs and Warner (1995), p.2] 
3 See Sachs and Warner (2001) for an interesting discussion about the robustness of the empirical evidence 
supporting the curse of natural resources hypothesis.  
4 Cohen and Weitzman (1975) elaborate a mathematical model, which provides a useful framework for the 
analysis of the role played by the enclosure movement as a push factor in English Industrial Revolution.    4
as a process of gradual elimination of sources of family subsistence other than wages, a causal 
link between the loss of common rights and wage dependence is reestablished.” (pp. 18-19) 
 
Many recent works have focused on exposing several mechanisms through which the scarcity 
of resources may stimulate growth processes; some of the most interesting are those of Rauch 
(1989), Matsuyama (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999, 2001), Rodriguez and Sachs 
(1999), Auty (2001), Gylfason (2001). A review of the various studies on this matter is not 
contemplated by the present article [for a brief review, please refer to Auty (2001), Gylfason 
(2001), Sachs and Warner (2001)]; however, to sum them up, the most important explanations 
can be classified as follows: 
 
1) Some authors have concentrated on exposing the channels by means of which the 
abundance of resources can affect the motivation and the efficiency of public administrators 
in implementing virtuous behaviours that are typically growth-inducing; that is to say, that 
characterize a “developmental state” [see e.g., Auty (1997, 2001), Gelb (1998)].  
Within this context, the ways in which natural resource abundance may inhibit the growth 
process are various. Above all, a crucial role is played by the fact that in a resource-rich 
economy, public administrators are mainly encouraged to adopt rent-seeking behaviours, as 
opposed to enforcing growth-inducing activities [see e.g. Tornell and Lane (1994), Lane and 
Tornell (1996) Karl (1997), Desai (1998)]. 
 
2) Another possible explanation is provided by Rodriguez and Sachs (1999). They analyse a 
Ramsey-model according to which they theorize that, in each instant of time, a constant [yet 
declining in per capita terms] and exogenously given amount of natural resources is sold on 
international markets and the natural resource revenues are invested in domestic capital
5. If 
the amount of natural resources exported in each instant of time is adequately large, the 
dynamics of the economy is characterized by an over-shooting effect: per capita capital 
accumulation and per capita consumption reach levels superior to those corresponding to the 
economy’s steady state. However, such levels cannot be sustained [as the pro capita revenues 
of natural resources diminish with time] and the level of capital converges to the steady state 
“from the right”, that is to say, revealing negative growth rates. 
                                                 
5 However, the model’s results are still valid even under the assumption that the export of natural resources can 
be used also to import consumer goods, as well as to increment the productive capital.   5
The overshooting trend in the Rodriguez and Sachs model can also occur assuming that the 
export of natural resources is optimally determined. Within this context, overshooting 
phenomena may occur even in economies with a stable population
6. 
 
3) We can provide a brief overview of the third mechanism, by means of which high 
availability of natural resources may inhibit economic growth, using the words of Sachs and 
Warner (2001): 
 
“Most current explanations for the curse [of natural resources] have a crowding-out logic. 
Natural resources crowd-out activity x. Activity x drives growth. Therefore, natural resources 
harm growth. Since there is a diversity of views regarding the second of these statements 
[what exactly drives growth], we have a similar diversity of views on the natural resource 
question.” [p. 833 (cursive added)]
7 
 
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999) identify x with traded-manufacturing activities and the 
crowding-out mechanism is the following: an increase of natural resources endowment may 
create an increase of demand for non-traded products driving up their prices. If these non-
traded goods are inputs in the production process of traded-goods [e.g. labour], the increase of 
non-traded goods’ prices reduces profits in the traded good sector [which sell its products on 
international markets at relatively fixed prices]. The consequent decline of the traded 
activities inhibits economic growth. 
In Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega (1999) e in Gylfason (2001), the crowded-out sector x 
is education: 
 
“…….nations that are confident that their natural resources are their most important asset may 
inadvertently –and perhaps even deliberately!- neglect the development of their human 
resources, by devoting inadequate attention and expenditure to education. Their natural wealth 
may blind them to the need for educating their children.” [Gylfason (2001), p. 850] 
 
Matsuyama (1992) identifies x with the industrial sector; in particular, he analyses an 
economy defined by two sectors – the agricultural sector and the industrial sector – in which 
                                                 
6 The only assumption that plays a key role in the Rodriguez and Sachs model is the lack of access to 
international asset markets where the economy could invest its natural resource revenues in international assets 
paying permanent annuities. 
7 Obviously, we can include the explanations given under point 1) within this case. Even so, we preferred to keep 
them separate for the sake of clarity.   6
the scarcity of natural resources is represented by low productivity in the agricultural sector. 
Economic agents react to the low productivity of the agricultural sector by increasing labour 
input within the industrial sector, where an accumulation process of knowledge driven by a 
learning-by-doing mechanism works. Matsuyama’s model is based on the open economy 
assumption, that is to say, economic agents may import goods not produced by the domestic 
agricultural sector. Positive externalities within the industrial sector and the possibility of 
substituting domestic agricultural products with imported ones are both essential elements of 
this model. 
Within this context, Matsuyama shows that the economy’s growth rate is inversely 
correlated to the productivity of the agricultural sector; he also demonstrates that low 
productivity of the agricultural sector can induce an economic growth path, which Pareto-
dominates that of another economy with [ceteris paribus] a higher productivity of the 
agricultural sector. 
Economic growth is always desirable in Matsuyama’s model and in the other models in the 
abovementioned literature; that is, the increase of the activity level of sector x always leads to 
an increase of economic agents’ well-being. In our model, we focus our attention on the 
analysis of the role that negative externalities -generated by the development of sector x- may 
play in determining growth dynamics and economic agents’ well-being. Our main objective is 
to point out a mechanism according to which negative externalities may be an engine of 
economic growth and to show that economic growth may be associated  with a reduction in 
economic agents’ well-being, differently from the cases in which economic growth is fuelled 
exclusively by positive externalities. 
 
2. SUBSTITUTES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES 
The basic assumption on which our model is grounded concerns the existence of a private 
good, which can be consumed as a substitute for the free access environmental resource; in 
order to face the deterioration of the natural resource, economic agents may substitute 
consumption patterns and economic activities requiring high availability of the environmental 
resource with consumption patterns and economic activities less affected by environmental 
deterioration. Within this context, the increase in their labour input in sector x may be 
interpreted as a self–protection choice, enabling them to alleviate the negative consequences 
generated by the scarcity of natural resources.   7
The possibility of substituting natural resources with an increase of the activity level in 
sector  x has essentially been contemplated in many of the abovementioned works. For 
example, we can consider Matsuyama’s model; in this model, the possibility of substitution is 
made certain by foreign trade, which – through the export of the goods produced in sector x 
and the import of agricultural goods – allows a reduction of the damages generated by the low 
productivity of the domestic agricultural sector. 
Substitution possibilities are various and those concerning the agricultural sector constitute 
only a portion of them. For example, let’s consider the tourism sector; an economy can derive 
consistent revenues from such sector, which, ceteris paribus, possesses greater growth 
potential, the higher the endowment of environmental resources is. However, the revenues 
derived from the tourism sector can be substituted by the revenues produced by any other 
economic activity. 
Other substitution possibilities are associated with the consumption of environmental 
resources as final goods rather than as intermediate goods. In this case, the scarcity of 
environmental resources can make “environment intensive” consumption patterns 
comparatively less attractive than those based on the consumption of private goods, which are 
less likely to experience the negative effects deriving from environmental deterioration. 
The main focus of our model will concern the transformation of consumption patterns 
generated by environmental deterioration
8. The notion that environmental deterioration may 
alter consumption patterns causing them to become more dependent on the consumption of 
private goods rather than on the consumption of free access environmental resources is shared 
by several works on the subject of environmental defensive expenditures [see e.g. Hueting 
(1980), Shibata and Winrich (1983), Leipert (1989), Shogren and Crocker (1993), Antoci 
(1996), Antoci and Bartolini (1999, 2004), Bartolini e Bonatti (2002)].  
Here are some traditional examples. Mineral water may substitute spring water or tap 
water. Medicines may mitigate the effects of respiratory diseases caused by air pollution. 
Individuals may react to the deterioration of the seaside near home by going to a less 
deteriorated seaside area by car or by boat, they may build a swimming pool in their gardens, 
they may purchase houses in exclusive areas at the seaside or buy holiday-packages in 
tropical paradises. Individuals may defend themselves from external sources of noise by 
installing sound-proofing devices, and so on. However, the general insight provided by said 
literature is that individual reactions to environmental deterioration can be diverse and are 
                                                 
 
8 However, this model can be easily modified in a two-sector model – the sector x and the agricultural or tourism 
sector – in which the natural resources enter as intermediate goods.   8
likely to deeply influence consumption patterns, increasing the consumption of private and 
expensive goods as opposed to free access environmental resources. Urban life offers an 
illustrative example of said substitution mechanism. Cities are often characterized by the 
scarcity of free access environmental resources and, at the same time, they are able to supply 
a considerable variety of private and expensive consumption opportunities [see e.g. Hueting 
(1980), Antoci and Bartolini (1999, 2004), Bartolini e Bonatti (2002)]. The scarcity of areas 
where individuals can meet away from the dangers of city traffic brings on additional 
expenses for childcare [baby-sitters, playgrounds, etc.], as well as for the leisure of adults. To 
a degree, the reason for the constant increase in the consumption of “home entertainment” in 
the industrial society can indeed be found in the substitution mechanism as previously 
defined
9. 
In our model, individual substitutive consumption made with the aim of facing   
environmental deterioration generates negative externalities on all the other agents, as it 
furthers environmental deterioration. This context has been examined by Shogren and Croker 
(1991), who demonstrate that if the self-protecting choices of an economic agent “transfer” 
the environmental damage on to other economic agents, and if the economic agents do not 
coordinate themselves, then the self-protecting choices are enforced beyond the socially 
optimal level
10. However, Shogren and Croker analyse a static model and do not develop their 
model in order to further examine the consequences that an “excess” of self-protecting 
choices may determine on economic growth, should the self-protecting choices involve the 
consumption of private goods and services. In our model we expand Shogren and Croker’s 
work in this direction. 
Beltratti (1996) analyses a model wherein environmental goods and private goods are 
substitute. Such model differs from ours for two main reasons. The first one relates to the fact 
that in Beltratti’s model decisions are made by a social planner; therefore, there are no 
positive nor negative externalities, and consequently, such model is not likely to examine the 
cumulative effect determined by the interaction between positive and negative externalities, as 
we do in our model. The second reason is that Beltratti analyses a model in which the 
produced goods may be accumulated in order to become capital and in which labour input is 
exogenously given. In this context, an increase in the substituted consumption in the instant of 
                                                 
9 A phenomenon that is in many instances considered a consequence of environmental deterioration and is often 
associated with a radical transformation of consumption patterns is rural exodus. With urbanization, 
consumption patterns tend to become market-oriented. The resources that were freely accessible in rural 
communities become accessible only through purchase on the market of substituted goods and, therefore, 
through entry in the labour market [see e.g. Humphries (1990), Myers (1997), Epstein and Jezeph (2001)]. 
10 The distinction between self-protecting options that “transfer” negative externalities on to other economic 
agents and options that instead “filter” them has been introduced by Bird (1987).    9
time of reference cannot be achieved increasing the labour input, and therefore it completely 
weighs on the accumulation of capital, which is reduced; as a consequence, environmental 
deterioration inhibits growth in Beltratti’s model
11. 
The idea that environmental negative externalities can be an engine of economic growth 
was first introduced, in a mathematical model, by Antoci (1996) and Antoci and Bartolini 
(1997, 1999)
12.  In these works, the selection process of labour inputs and of consumption 
patterns is analysed in an evolutionary game context without accumulation of assets. Antoci 
and Bartolini (1994) contains a further development of such models. 
 Bartolini e Bonatti (2003) have analysed the dynamics of the accumulation of physical 
capital in an economy where agents possess perfect foresight and they have showed that it is 
possible to have undesirable economic growth generated by negative externalities even 
assuming that the economic agents are perfectly rational
13. 
The present article intends to advance this pattern of research, analysing the dynamics of 
growth generated by the choices of economic agents, which “adapt” to the variations of the 
context in which they operate, variations that are caused both by negative [environmental 
deterioration] and by positive externalities [increase in labour productivity]. Within this 
framework, it is possible to point out some of the interaction mechanisms between positive 
and negative externalities that are likely to generate significant consequences in the growth 
process of an economy and in the well-being of economic agents
14.  
 
3. THE MODEL 
We analyze the dynamics of an economy with an infinite number [a continuum] of identical 
agents. In each instant of time t, the representative agent’s well-being depends on three goods: 
(1) Leisure:  ) ( 1 t l − . 
                                                 
11 It is correct to emphasize the fact that Beltratti’s model focuses on proving that in the event of substituted 
consumption, the optimal co-evolution* of capital and environmental deterioration may not give rise to the 
environmental Kuznets’ curve. 
12 The idea that negative externalities deriving from economic growth may, in their turn, “fuel” the growth 
process through the enforcement of defensive consumption has been contemplated by economic literature at least  
since Hirsh’s famous work (1976). However, it was only recently that this idea was introduced in mathematical 
models.  
13 Antoci, Sacco e Vanin (2004) analyse a model wherein economic agents possess perfect foresight and 
accumulate physical and social capital; in such model, economic agents may face the negative externalities 
generated by a low level of social capital, by increasing their consumption of private goods. Within this context, 
the authors point out some of the mechanisms through which the accumulation of physical capital and the 
accumulation of social capital may end up being in conflict. 
14 Bartolini e Bonatti (2002) analyse a model in which growth is driven by environmental negative externalities 
and in which an asset is accumulated by way of a mechanism similar to the one considered in our model. 
However, Bartolini e Bonatti analyse the choices of the economic agents in a time span made up of a fixed 
number of periods. Then again such context (which is essentially a static optimization one) does not allow for the 
examination of the variety and stability of fixed points; consequently, it does not consent the comparative 
evaluation of well-being among alternative fixed points.   10
(2)  A free access flow of a renewable environmental good: E(t). 
(3)  A flow of a non-storable private good produced by the agent: Y(t). 
The flow Y(t) can be consumed by the representative agent as a substitute for the 
environmental good,  ) ( 2 t c , or to satisfy needs different from those satisfied by the 
environmental good,  ) ( 1 t c . Since Y(t) is not storable, it holds  ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 t c t c t Y + = . 
 
The representative agent’s production function 
We assume that, in each instant of time t, the representative agent can produce the private 
good by the following production function 
 
[ ]
α ) ( ) ( ) ( t K t l t Y =  
 
where l(t) represents the representative agent’s labor input and K(t) represents knowledge 
capital; α  is a parameter satisfying  1 0 < <α . As in Matsuyama (1992), we assume that K(t) 
is a pure public good. The environmental good is not an input in the production process of the 
private good.  
 
The representative agent’s utility function 
We assume that E enters as a final good in the utility function of agents and that E and  2 c  are 
perfect substitutes with marginal rate of substitution equal to the parameter b
15; in particular, 
we assume that the representative agent’s [instantaneous] utility function is the following 
 
) 1 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) , , ( 2 1 2 1 l d bc E a c bc E l c U − + + + = +     (1) 
 
with 0 , , > d b a .  
As an alternative, we could assume E to be an intermediate good, entering as input in some 
production function, for example, with regard to the tourism or agricultural sector. However, 
at least a priori, we do not expect such variation of the model to provide substantially 
diverging predictions, opposed to those regarding the model currently under analysis and 
therefore, for the sake of simplicity, we will only take into account the hypothesis in which E 
is a final good.  
                                                 
15 The hypothesis of perfect substitutability between E(t) and  ) ( 2 t c  is made essentially for the sake of analytical 
simplicity; it could be relaxed by assuming that they are imperfect substitutes obtaining similar results. 
   11
 
Time evolution of K(t) and E(t) 
We assume that knowledge capital K(t) evolves according to a learning-by-doing mechanism; 
in particular, the dynamics of K(t)  is given by the differential equation 
 




      ( 2 )  
 
where ) (t K
•
 is the time derivative of K(t), the parameter  0 > η  is the depreciation rate of K(t), 
) (t l  is the average labor input in the economy and consequently  [ ]
α
) ( ) ( t K t l  represents the 
average production of private goods. 
We assume that the dynamics of E(t) is given by 
 
[ ] [] []
α
γ β ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t K t l t E E t E t E − − =
•
     (3) 
 
where  [ ] ) ( ) ( t E E t E − β  is the usual [logistic] regeneration function; the parameter  0 > β  
represents the regeneration rate of E(t) and the parameter  0 > E  represents the value that E(t) 
should approach if there were no production of private goods in the economy. So E  may be 
interpreted as the “endowment” of the environmental good. 
The rate of growth of E(t), ) ( / ) ( t E t E
•
, is negatively affected by the average production 
[]
α
) ( ) ( t K t l ; the parameter  0 > γ  measures the negative impact of average production on the 
growth rate of E(t). 
 
 
4. THE CHOICES OF THE REPRESENTATIVE AGENT  
Since in the economy there is a continuum of identical agents, the labor input choice l(t) of 
each of them doesn’t modify the average value  ) (t l . So, in each instant of time, the 
representative agent takes  ) (t l  as exogenously given. This implies that he does not take into 
account the “shadow” prices of E and K; that is, in every instant of time, he is maximizing the 
utility function (1) with respect to the choice variables: l ,  1 c  and  2 c .   12
In each instant of time t, the choices of the representative agent are defined by the following 
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From (4) and (5) we obtain the following choice functions 
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The choice of  1 c  is obtained by subtracting the substitutive consumption  2
~ c  from the output 
α K E K l ) , (
~
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separates the positive orthant of the plane (K, E) in two regions; in the region above it, the 
environmental good is not perceived as “scarce” relatively to the value of K and the 
                                                 
16 With the utility function (1), the conditions  1 ) ( 0 < < t l  and  0 ) ( 1 > t c  always hold.   13
representative agent has no incentive to produce and consume output as a substitute for the 
environmental good [that is,  0 ~
2 = c ]. Below Ω, the representative agent chooses  0 ~
2 > c . 
Note that the labor input  ) , (
~
E K l  is constant above Ω while it becomes a strictly decreasing 
function of E below Ω; if E decreases, given K, the representative agent has to work more to 
produce the private substitute for the environmental good. 
 
 
5. GROWTH DYNAMICS 
Since all agents are identical, the average labor input l coincides [ex-post] with the 
representative agent’s choice  ) , (
~
E K l . So, the dynamical system (2)-(3) becomes 
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The former equation of system (6) can be explicitly written as 
 



















































 [below the curve Ω]. 
 
The latter equation of system (6) can be explicitly written as 
   14
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Systems (7)-(9) and (8)-(10) describe dynamics above the curve Ω and below the curve Ω, 
respectively. 
It is easy to check that 
•
K  and 
•
E  are continuous functions of K and E for every K and E
17; 











K  is a decreasing function of E [given K]. More precisely, above Ω, the 
evolution of K doesn’t depend on E [see equation (7)]; below Ω, 
•
K  is a strictly decreasing 
function of E [see equation (8)]. Therefore, the accumulation of K is fuelled by the depletion 
of the environmental good. A reduction of E increases agents’ need of private substitutes for 
the environmental good and consequently their labor supply. The consequent increase  of 
aggregate output has a positive effect on the accumulation of K [positive externalities] but 
causes a further depletion of the environmental good [negative externalities]. Therefore, 
system (6) describes a self-enforcing mechanism according to which negative externalities are 
an engine of economic growth. By such mechanism, environmental degradation is not only a 




6. CLASSIFICATION OF DYNAMICS 
In this section we give a classification of dynamic regimes under our model. Mathematical 
details are left to appendixes 1, 2 and 3. In such classification, we omit to consider “non-
                                                 
17 More precisely, they are Lipschitz functions.   15
robust” cases; that is, those dynamic regimes which hold only for particular values of the 
parameters of the model
18. 
In the classification there are some threshold values of the parameters E  and γ ; when such 
values are crossed, the dynamics of the economy pass from one dynamic regime to another 
one. Remember that the parameter E  may be interpreted as the endowment of the 
environmental good while the parameter γ  represents the negative impact of economic 
activity on the environment. 
These thresholds values are the following 
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It always holds 
U L
γ γ < , while 
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γ γ γ < <  always. 
Let us now give a classification of robust dynamic regimes under system (6). In the 
following figures, attractive fixed points of dynamics are represented by full dots  ) (• , 
                                                 
18 More precisely, we define as “non-robust” the dynamic regimes that are observed only if an equality condition 
on the values of parameters is satisfied.    16




Case:   γ γ ≤
U
 
This case is characterized by a relatively high value of γ . The corresponding dynamic 
regimes are showed in figures 1-3. There are three sub-cases; each of them is associated with 
an interval of values of the parameter E . If 
∗ ∗
> E E , then there exist four fixed points [see 
figure 1]: the repulsive fixed point O, the saddles C and F, and the [globally] attracting fixed 








 [that is, D lies above the curve Ω]; therefore, in such a 
point, there is no scarcity of the environmental good [relatively to the value of K] and, 
consequently, agents don’t consume output as a substitute for the environmental good. 
If 
∗ ∗ ∗
< < E E E , then dynamics is characterized by a bi-stable regime in which there exist 
two [locally] attracting fixed points), C and D [see figure 2]. Almost all trajectories approach 
either C or D and their attraction basins are separated by the stable manifold Γ of the saddle 
point A. The fixed point O is repulsive and the fixed point F is a saddle. In the attracting fixed 
point C the environmental resource is completely depleted and agents have to rely completely 
on the consumption of the private good as a substitute for the environmental good. 
If 
∗
< E E , then the fixed point C is globally attracting, the fixed point O is repulsive and the 
fixed point F is a saddle [see figure 3]. 
Case: 
L
γ γ ≤  
This case is characterized by a relatively low impact of economic activity on environment. 
The corresponding dynamic regimes are showed in figures 4-6. All possible dynamics are 
characterized by the existence of a globally attracting fixed point. If 
∗
> E E , in the [globally] 
attracting fixed point D agents don’t consume substitutes for the environmental good [see 
figure 4]. If 
∗ ∗ ∗
< < E E E , in the attracting fixed point B it holds  0 > E  but the relatively low 
level of E induces agents to consume a share of output as a substitute [see figure 5]. If 
∗ ∗
< E E , in the attracting fixed point C the environmental good is completely depleted [see 
figure 6]. 
 
                                                 
19 The stable [unstable] manifold of a saddle type fixed point is the subset of the positive orthant of the plane (K, 
E) constituted by the union between the two trajectories approaching [respectively, diverging from] the fixed 
point and the fixed point itself.   17
Case: 
U L
γ γ γ < <  
Remember that, in this case, it holds 
∗ ∗ ∗
< E E  if and only if  γ γ >  [where 
U L
γ γ γ < <  
always]. Furthermore, it always holds  ( )
∗ ∗ ∗
> E E E
T
, max  [see mathematical appendixes]. 
This case presents the highest number of possible dynamic regimes. However, there is only 
one regime, which is qualitatively different from those already encountered in figures 1-6, 
specifically, the one corresponding to the sub-case  ( )
∗ ∗ ∗
> > E E E E
T
, max  and represented in 
figure 7. In such regime, there exist six fixed points: A, B, C, D, F, O. The fixed points B and 
D are locally attractive; almost all trajectories approach either B or D and their attraction 
basins are separated by the stable manifold Γ of the saddle A. The remaining fixed points are 
repulsive or saddles. 
In D agents don’t consume output as a substitute for the environmental good while in B they 
do. In this case, as opposed to the bi-stable regime represented in figure 2, in the attractive 
fixed point below the curve Ω the environmental resource is not completely depleted. 
The remaining dynamics can be classified as follows. If 
T
E E > , dynamics is [qualitatively] 
the same as the one depicted in figure 4; if 
∗ ∗ ∗
> > E E E  [ γ γ < ], dynamics is the same as the 
one represented in figure 5; if 
∗ ∗ ∗
> > E E E  [ γ γ > ], the corresponding dynamic regime is 
that showed in figure 2; finally, if  ( )
∗ ∗ ∗
< E E E , min , the dynamic regime is the same as that 
showed in figure 6. 
 
 
7. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
In order to interpret the results of the classification defined above, it is useful to compare the 
dynamics we have described with that under the assumption b = 0. If b = 0, there is no 
possibility of substitution between the private good and the environmental good and the 
dynamics is described by system (7)-(9) only, which in such case holds for every K and E. 
Under the assumption b = 0, it holds  0 =
•
K  for K = 0 and along the vertical line 
[] α η − + ≡ = 1
1
1 ) 1 ( / 1 d K K  [see appendixes]. This means that environmental degradation 
doesn’t affect the accumulation of K
20 and, consequently, dynamics becomes very simple. In 
particular, there always exists a globally attracting fixed point in which  1 K K = .  
                                                 
20 This occurs as we are analysing an economy made up of a continuum of agents; as a consequence, the 
economic activity of each agent does not have a relevant impact on the environmental good and in the absence of   18
In the case  0 > b , above the curve Ω, the locus  0 =
•
K  coincides with the locus  0 =
•
K  in 
the case b = 0; however, below the curve Ω, it lies entirely on the right of the line  1 K K = . 
This implies that the region where  0 >
•
K  is wider in case  0 > b  than in case b = 0 [see 
figures 1-7]. Therefore, the evolution of K is sensibly conditioned by the value of E and this 
gives rise to the variety of possible dynamic regimes showed in the previous classification. 
Note that, in the case  0 > b , the accumulation level  1 K  may still be reached by the 
economy; in particular, it is the value assumed by K at the fixed point D [when it exists], 
where private goods are not consumed as substitutes [see figures 1, 2, 4, 7]. However, for 
0 > b ,  1 K  is the minimum accumulation level that the economy may reach starting from a 
strictly positive value of K. If the economy doesn’t approach D, then it follows a trajectory 
converging to a fixed point with a higher value of K.  
From the above classification, note that [ceteris paribus] D exists if and only if the 
endowment  E  is high enough, that is if  ) , ( +∞ ∈
∗
E E  [see the cases represented in figures 1, 
2, 4 and 7], where 
∗
E  is a strictly increasing function of γ ; when the value of γ  increases, 




In the context  ) , ( +∞ ∈
∗
E E , D is globally attracting if E  is high enough [see cases 
represented in figures 1 and 4]; otherwise, dynamics is characterized by a bi-stable regime 
[figures 2 and 7] where the economy approaches D only if it starts sufficiently near to it. 
Observe that, in the bi-stable regimes, the stable manifold Γ of the saddle A can be 
considered as the graph of a strictly increasing function  ) ( ~ K E Γ =  defined for every 
) , 0 ( +∞ ∈ K
22. Given any initial value  0
0 > K  of K, the economy reaches D if the initial value 
0 E  of E is such that  ) ( ~ 0 0 K E Γ >  while it approaches the other attracting fixed point [B in 
figure 7, C in figure 2] if  ) ( ~ 0 0 K E Γ < . Therefore, in bi-stable regimes, whatever the initial 
value 0
0 > K  of K is, the economy can always follow a development trajectory leading it to 
the fixed point B or C if the initial value
0 E  of E is low enough. Being  ) ( ~ K E Γ =  a strictly 
                                                                                                                                                          
coordination [for example, by means of a social planner], none of them will enforce activities for the protection 
of the environmental good. 
21 Observe that 
∗
E  reaches a strictly positive minimum for  0 = γ ; consequently, if  E  is too low, then D 
doesn’t exist whatever the value of γ  is. 
22 It is easy to check that the function  ) (
~
K E Γ =  has not a vertical asymptote for K > 0; consequently, it is 
defined for every K > 0.   19
increasing function, the lower 
0 K  is, the lower 
0 E  must be for the economy to approach B or 
C. 
In bi-stable regimes, from the point of view of knowledge capital K, the fixed point D is a 
“poverty trap” with respect to the fixed points B and C. However, as we shall see in the 
following section, agents’ well-being at the fixed point D may be higher than that at the fixed 
points B and C. 
If  ) , 0 (
∗
∈ E E , the endowment of the environmental good is too low for the existence of the 
fixed point D; dynamics always reaches a globally attracting fixed point where K is greater 
than  1 K  and output is consumed as a substitute for the environmental good [see cases 
represented in figures 3, 5 and 6]. 
 
 
8. WELL-BEING ANALYSIS AND COMPARATIVE DYNAMICS 
Note that all the fixed points with K > 0 are characterized by an inverse relation between K 
and  E: the lower the value of K i s  a t  s u c h  p o i n t s ,  the higher the value of E is. Since 
representative agent’s labor supply  ) , (
~
E K l  is increasing in K and decreasing in E, this 
means that going from the left to the right of plane (K, E) we encounter fixed points with 
higher levels of accumulation K, of work effort, of private consumption and of environmental 
degradation. Therefore, in an economy where agents do not internalize negative and positive 
externalities, it is possible that a correlation between the value of K [and of the aggregate 
output] and the agents’ well-being will not exist. This paragraph aims at calculating the value 
assumed by the utility function of the representative agent in the different fixed points of the 
dynamic regime in relation to the variation of the most significant parameters of the model. 
Given that, in most cases, it is not possible to determine the coordinates of fixed points, it is 
necessary to resort to some numerical examples. 
 
Numerical exercise 1 (figure 8) 
The first example of numerical exercise we shall consider is the one showed in figure 8. In 
such figure, for sake of simplicity, only a portion of curves 0 =
•
K  and  0 =
•
E  has been traced, 
specifically that which lays under curve Ω. The corresponding dynamic regime is the one 
defined in figure 7 (to each fixed point is associated the value U that the utility function 
assumes in it). We can observe the existence of an inverse correlation between the value of K 
and well-being. The fixed point D [attracting], which has the lowest accumulation level,   20
Pareto-dominates all the others; in particular, it dominates the other attracting fixed point, 
point B. 
The fixed point A also dominates B, yet A is a saddle and therefore it is unstable. 
 
Numerical exercise 2 (figure 9) 
Figure 9 shows the values assumed by the utility function in each of the fixed points A, B, C, 
D of the bi-stable regime represented in figure 7 in relation to the variation of parameter b [the 
marginal rate of substitution between the private good and E]. It is worth remembering that in 
D the accumulation is at its lowest possible level; then A, B and C follow, in this order. We 
observe that the value of the utility function in D does not depend on the value of the 
parameter b, given that in D output is not consumed as a substitute for the environmental 
good. In the other fixed points, the utility increases as b increases. We notice that, as b 
increases, at first D dominates all the other fixed points; particularly, it dominates B, which is 
the other attracting fixed point of the bi-stable regime. Then, in case of considerably high 
values of b, B dominates D. 
 
Numerical exercise 3 (figure 10) 
This numerical exercise shows the variation of economic dynamics and of the value of the 
utility function in relation to the variation of parameter b; in figure 10 we can observe that, 
with b = 0.4, the point D is globally attracting [dynamics described in figure 4] and dominates 





E  are closer to each other and the difference between the values of the utility 
function in D and C is reduced. With b=1.2 we achieve a bi-stable regime [dynamics 
described in figure 7], in which D dominates all the other fixed points, in particular B, the 
other attracting fixed point. The point B is also dominated by A, which however is a saddle 
point. Finally, with b=1.6, the point D is very near to the point A and the point B is very close 
to the point C; if b further increases, the bi-stable regime ceases to exist and C becomes 
globally attracting [dynamics described in figure 6].  
It is interesting to notice in this example that in cases with b=0.4 and b=0.8, the value of the 
utility function assumed in D [which is globally attracting] is higher than that of B in cases 
with b=1.2 and b=1.6. This suggests that an improvement in the substitution possibilities 
between the output and the environmental good does not always produce desirable effects. In 
fact, in this example, as b increases, the attracting fixed point B “emerges”, dominated by D, 
which does not exist with lower values of b.   21
Numerical exercise 4 (figure 11) 
In figure 11 we consider an example that can help to show how the dynamics of economy and 
of well-being can be influenced by variations of γ , the parameter measuring the impact on 
the environment due to economic activity. With  04 . 0 = γ , D is globally attracting [dynamics 
described in figure 4]. The same applies with  07 . 0 = γ ; however, in this case, the 
curves 0 =
•
K  and  0 =
•
E  are closer to each other. With  1 . 0 = γ  and  12 . 0 = γ , said curves 
meet, producing the bi-stable regimes defined in figures 7 and 2 respectively. It is worth 
mentioning that an increase in γ gives rise to an attracting fixed point, possessing a level of 
accumulation higher than that of D. Therefore, an exogenous increase of γ can lead to an 
increase of K and of the aggregate output. We observe that in both cases of bi-stable 
dynamics, D dominates the other attracting fixed point [B in the case  1 . 0 = γ , C in the case 
12 . 0 = γ ]. 
 
Numerical exercise 5 (figure 12) 
Figure 12 shows the effects produced by the variation of parameterE , which measures the 
endowment of environmental good. With  8 . 2 = E , the  point C is globally attracting 
[dynamics described in figure 6]. With  6 . 5 = E , the fixed points A and D emerge, very near 
to each other [dynamics described in figure 2], and D Pareto-dominates both A and C. As the 
endowment increases, for 4 . 8 = E , the point B also emerges and it becomes attracting in place 
of C [dynamic described in figure 7]. Finally, for  2 . 11 = E , the point D becomes globally 
attracting [dynamics described in figure 4]. In all the considered cases, the point D [when it 
exists] dominates all the other fixed points. Please note, in this example as well as in the 
preceding ones, how comparatively high the gap is between the value of K in D and the value 
of K in the fixed points dominated by D. 
 
Numerical exercise 6 (figure 13) 
Figure 13 considers the consequences associated with a variation of parameterβ , measuring 
the regeneration rate of the environmental good. For 04 . 0 = β , the points D and C are both 
attracting [dynamics described in figure 2]. With 07 . 0 = β , the curves 0 =
•
K  and  0 =
•
E  come 
closer to each other, and with 1 . 0 = β , they meet underΩ at the points A and B, with B being 
attracting [dynamics described in figure 7]. Finally, with 12 . 0 = β , D becomes globally   22
attracting. This exercise shows how a reduction in the regeneration capacity of the 
environmental good can produce an increase in the value of K and of the aggregate 
production. In fact, asβ  decreases, some attracting fixed points emerge, in which K assumes 
values higher than those in D. Even in this example, in the fixed points, well-being is 




The general prediction of the model is that the higher the environmental impact γ  and the 
substitution rate b are and the lower the endowment E  of the environmental good and the 
regeneration rate β  are, the higher the economy’s accumulation and consumption level will 
be. An exogenous reduction of E  and of β , or an exogenous increase of γ  or of b may 
generate an increase of the aggregate product and of the level of K in the economy. Economic 
growth is fueled by the increase of “work motivation” of the economic agents, as a 
consequence of the gradual deterioration of the environmental resource, which induces agents 
to alter their consumption patterns, concentrating more and more on the consumption of 
private and expensive goods, rather than on the consumption of free access environmental 
goods. 
This study has proved that, in the analysed economy, two different “undesirable” settings 
are possible, both a consequence of a coordination failure among economic agents; the 
economy may reach a “poverty trap”, characterized by a low level of accumulation of 
knowledge capital – from which economic agents could step out by increasing their private 
consumption and their labour input within the industrial sector – or else, economy could 
converge to a “private consumption trap”, characterized by an excessive consumption of 
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APPENDIX 1: BASIC MATHEMATICAL RESULTS FOR SYSTEM (7)-(9) 
For simplicity, we will not consider “non-robust” dynamics; that is, those corresponding to 
equality conditions on parameter values. In the positive orthant of the plane (K,  E), the 








, by system (8)-(10) 
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separates the two regions. 
Let us first analyze system (7)-(9). Under such system, it holds  0 =
•
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Let us now look for fixed points under system (7)-(9). Notice that there exists always the 









 if and only if (iff)  1 2 K K > ; that is, iff 
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Under system (7)-(9), it holds  0 >
•
E  on the left of (13) and  0 <
•
E  on the right. Furthermore, 
it holds  0 >
•
K  on the left of the straight line (12) and  0 <
•
K  on the right. 
Since at the fixed points the loci  0 =
•
K  and  0 =
•
E  always intersect transversally, the fixed 
points are always hyperbolic
23; this implies that they can be of three types only: sinks 
[attracting], sources [repelling] and saddles. So it is very easy to check that under system (7)-
(9) the fixed point  ) , 0 ( E  is a saddle and the fixed point with K>0, when existing, is a sink. 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: BASIC MATHEMATICAL RESULTS FOR SYSTEM (8)-(10) 
The loci where  0 =
•
K  and  0 =
•
E  
Under system (8)-(10), it holds  0 =
•
K  along the curve 
 
[ ] η
α ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1 d a K a K
d
b
E + + − + =
−      ( 1 6 )  
 
Note that the function (16) is strictly concave; it is initially an increasing function of K and 
subsequently it becomes decreasing. Furthermore, it holds  0 >
•
K  below the curve (16) and 
0 <
•
K  above it. 
Since 
•
K  is a continuous decreasing function of E in the positive orthant of the plane (K, E), 
below the curve (11) it holds  0 >
•
K  when  1 K K ≤  [see (12)]. This implies that, below (11), 
the locus  0 =
•
K  lies entirely in the region with  1 K K > . 
It holds  0 =
•
E  for E = 0 and along the curve 
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α        (17) 
 
if 0 ) 1 ( ≠ + + − d a b d β γ , or along the straight line 
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if 0 ) 1 ( = + + − d a b d β γ . Note that, when  0 ) 1 ( > + + − d a b d β γ , (17) is a strictly increasing 
function of K and it is strictly concave. The opposite holds if  0 ) 1 ( < + + − d a b d β γ . 
Furthermore, in the plane (K, E), it holds  0 >
•
E  on the left of (17), (18) and  0 <
•
E  on the 
right. 
Let us now look for the intersection points between the K-axis and the curves (16), (17). It is 
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The fixed points under system (8)-(10) 
Let us now look for the fixed points under system (8)-(10), that is the fixed points lying below 
the curve (11). Observe that there always exists a fixed point  ) 0 , ( ) , ( 3 K E K =  where the 
environmental good is completely depleted. Let us now consider fixed points in which E > 0, 
corresponding to the intersections between (16) and (17)-(18). Note that the curves (16) and 
(18) have at most one intersection point; so, there exists at most one fixed point for 
0 ) 1 ( = + + − d a b d β γ . For  0 ) 1 ( ≠ + + − d a b d β γ , by plugging together the right hand sides 
of equations (16) and (17), we obtain the following equation   28
 
[ ]K d a b d E d K a b ) 1 ( ) 1 ( + + − − = + β γ η β β
α    ( 2 2 )  
 
The solutions of (22) give the values of K at the fixed points with E > 0. Observe that the 
function of K on the left side of (22) is strictly concave, while the right side of (22) represents 
a straight line. Therefore, there exists at most one fixed point of system (8)-(10) with E > 0 if 




γ ]  
and there exist at most two fixed points if 











Let us define 
α β K a b K f ) 1 ( ) ( + ≡  and  [ ]K d a b d E d K g ) 1 ( ) ( + + − − ≡ β γ η β  [see equation 
(22)]. As said above, f(K) is a strictly concave function while g(K) represents a straight line 
with positive slope which translates downward if the value of E  goes down. Consequently, 
fixed all parameters’ values except that of E , there always exists a value of E , 
T
E , by which 
the graphs of f(K) and g(K) are tangent for some value of K > 0; let us indicate such a value 
by 
T
K . If 
 





then the point of tangency lies below the curve (11) in the plane (K, E) and at such point it 




E E < , there exist two fixed points 
with E > 0 lying below the curve (11) [see figure 14]. If 
T
K K > 1  [see figure 15], then a 
reduction of E  cannot generate two fixed points. The same holds if 
T
K K < 3  [see figure 16]. 
Let us now see what are the conditions on parameters’ values giving rise to cases 
3 1 K K K
T
< < , 
T
K K > 1  and 
T
K K < 3 . To this end, note that the value of 
T
K  is obtained 
by solving the equation f’(K) = g’(K), which gives the value 
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It is easy to check that 
T
K K < 1  iff 
 
[] ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 d a d a
d
b L
+ + − + + ≡ > α
β
γ γ     ( 2 4 )  
 
and  3 K K
T
<  iff 
 
) 1 )( 1 ( d a
d
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+ + − ≡ < α
β
γ γ     ( 2 5 )  
 
where  ) 1 ( d a
d
b U L
+ + < <
β
γ γ  always. 
The value of 
T
E  is easily determined by substituting 
T
K K =  in equation (22) and solving 
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APPENDIX 3: CLASSIFICATION OF DYNAMICS 
We can now classify the dynamic regimes under our model.  





The curve  0 =
•
E  is downward sloping [see (13)] above the curve (11) while it is strictly 
increasing or lies on a vertical straight line below it [see figures 1-3]. In such context, 
4 3 K K <  implies  2 1 K K <
25; therefore, it always holds 
∗ ∗ ∗
< E E
26. So, excluding non-robust 
                                                 
25 Remember that  1 K  and  3 K  are the values of K in correspondence of which the curve  0 =
•
K  intersects the 
curve (11) and the K-axis respectively;  2 K  and  4 K  are the values of K in correspondence of which the curve 
0 =
•
E  intersects the curve (11) and the K-axis respectively [see (12), (14), (19) and (20)].   30
cases, the possible dynamic regimes are those showed in figures 1-3 of the main text. Stability 
analysis can be worked out by simply analyzing the “arrow diagrams” in figures 1-3. In fact, 
in such cases, the loci  0 =
•
K  and  0 =
•
E  always intersect transversally. Therefore, the fixed 
points are always hyperbolic; this implies that they can be of three types only -saddles, 
sources [repelling] or sinks [attracting]- and consequently the classification of each fixed 
point is straightforward. 
 





Sub-case II.1:   γ γ ≤
U 27 
From figure 16 note that, as in case (I),  4 3 K K <  implies  2 1 K K <  and consequently it 
always holds 
∗ ∗ ∗
< E E . Therefore, the classification of dynamic regimes in this sub-case 
coincides with that of case (I), showed in figures 1-3
28. 
 
Sub-case II.2:  
L
γ γ ≤  
From figure 15, we can see that  2 1 K K <  implies  4 3 K K <  and consequently it always holds 
∗ ∗ ∗
> E E . The dynamic regimes corresponding to this sub-case are showed in figures 4-6. As 
for the dynamics in (I) and (II.1), the stability properties of fixed points can be 
unambiguously inferred from arrow diagrams in figures 4-6. 
 
Sub-case II.3:  
U L
γ γ γ < <  
It holds 
∗ ∗ ∗























                                                                                                                                                          
 
26 See (15), (21). 





γ  always. 
28 Differently from the case I, in this case the slope of the curve  0 =
•
E , under the curve (11), is negative. 
However, this feature makes no [qualitative] difference between the dynamic regimes of sub-case (II.1) and 
those of case (I) described in figures 1-3.   31
Remember that 
∗ ∗ ∗
< E E  and 
∗ ∗ ∗
> E E  for 
U
γ γ ≥  and 
L
γ γ ≤  respectively





E  continuous functions of γ , by the intermediate value theorem it follows that 
U L
γ γ γ < < . 
Dynamics can be classified as follows: If 
T
E E > , the dynamics is [qualitatively] the same 
as that depicted in figure 4; if  ( )
∗ ∗ ∗
> > E E E E
T
, max , the dynamics is that showed in figure 
7; if 
∗ ∗ ∗
> > E E E  [ γ γ < ], the dynamic regime is that represented in figure 5; if 
∗ ∗ ∗
> > E E E  [ γ γ > ], the dynamics is the same as that in figure 2; finally, if 
( )
∗ ∗ ∗
< E E E , min , the dynamic regime is the same as that showed in figure 6. 
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Figure 4   34
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A  saddle point
B  stable point
C  saddle point









Figure 8: α=0.5, β=0.1, γ=0.1, η=0.05, a=8, b=1, d=5,  Ē=8.7   36































A      U=15.2299
B      U=14.8227
C      U=14.481
























A      U=14.7335
B      U=12.8093
C      U=12.1796













C      U=8.9359






C      U=3.3907












C      U=10.721






C      U=10.721













A      U=13.7032
B      U=11.8567
C      U=10.721
























A      U=13.6389
C      U=10.721







































A      U=13.6973
B      U=11.0555
C      U=10.721





















C      U=10.721










A      U=11.2952
C      U=10.721



























A      U=13.7032
B      U=11.8567
C      U=10.721


























A      U=13.4534
C      U=10.721
D      U=15.0419
A      U=12.647
C      U=10.721
D      U=14.4158
C      U=10.721







Figure 13: α=0.5, γ=0.1, η=0.05, a=8, b=1, d=5, Ē=8.7 
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